"[Is] the view that the future is partly comprised of possibilities and is therefore known by God as partly comprised of possibilities. (By the way, I prefer to refer to this view as “the open view of the future,” since the most distinctive aspect of Open Theism is not its understanding of the nature of God, but its understanding of the nature of the future)."
"To expound a bit on this definition, the open view of the future holds that God chose to create a cosmos that is populated with free agents – at least humans and angels (though some hold that there is a degree of freedom, however small, in all sentient beings). To have free will means that one has the ability to transition several possible courses of action into one actual course of action. This is precisely why Open Theists hold that the future is partly comprised of possibilities. While God can decide to pre-settle whatever aspects of the future he wishes, to the degree that he has given agents freedom, God has chosen to leave the future open, as a domain of possibilities, for agents to resolve with their free choices. This view obviously conflicts with the understanding of the future that has been espoused by classical theologians, for the traditional view is that God foreknows from all eternity the future exclusively as a domain of exhaustively definite facts."
As such, the contibutors, Richard Rice, John Sanders, Clark Pinnock, William Hasker and David Basinger, persuasively argue for an open rather than a deterministic view of the existence of God (and or relation to him) from scriptural, philosophical, theological, systematic and practical perspectiives. Their conclusion? No, not "everything happens for a reason," especially by divine reason. If it did, then God would be culpable of the greatest atrocities from original sin to the slaughter of Jewish innocents during the Second World War.
Boyd goes on:
"Many passages of Scripture depict God as foreknowing and/or predetermining certain things about the future. But there are also many passages that depict the future is open (not determined) and depict God as knowing it as a realm partly comprised of possibilities.
Some examples of these Scriptures include:
- The Lord frequently changes his mind in the light of changing circumstances, or as a result of prayer (Exod. 32:14; Num. 14:12–20; Deut. 9:13–14, 18–20, 25; 1 Sam. 2:27–36; 2 Kings 20:1–7; 1 Chron. 21:15; Jer. 26:19; Ezek. 20:5–22; Amos 7:1–6; Jonah 1:2; 3:2, 4–10). At other times he explicitly states that he will change his mind if circumstances change (Jer. 18:7–11; 26:2–3; Ezek. 33:13–15). This willingness to change is portrayed as one of God’s attributes of greatness (Joel 2:13–14; Jonah 4:2).
- Sometimes God expresses regret and disappointment over how things turned out—sometimes even including the results of his own will. (Gen. 6:5–6; 1 Sam. 15:10, 35; Ezek. 22:29–31).
- At other times he tells us that he is surprised at how things turned out because he expected a different outcome (Isa. 5:3–7; Jer. 3:67; 19–20).
- The Lord frequently tests his people to find out whether they’ll remain faithful to him (Gen. 22:12; Exod. 16:4; Deut. 8:2; 13:1–3; Judges 2:20–3:5; 2 Chron. 32:31).The Lord sometimes asks non-rhetorical questions about the future (Num. 14:11; Hos. 8:5) and speaks to people in terms of what may or may not happen (Exod. 3:18–4:9; 13:17; Jer. 38:17–18, 20–21, 23; Ezek. 12:1–3).The Lord frequently speaks of the future in terms of what may and may not come to pass (Ex.4:1-7; Ex. 13:17; Ezek 12:3).
Classical theologians often consider only the passages that demonstrate that the future is settled either in God’s mind (foreknowledge) or in God’s will (predestination) as revealing the whole truth about God’s knowledge of the future. They interpret passages (such as the above) that suggest God faces a partly open future as merely figurative. I do not see this approach as warranted on either exegetical or theological grounds. I am therefore compelled to interpret both sets of passages as equally literal and therefore draw the conclusion that the future that God faces is partly open and partly settled."
According to the authors, the classical view of a deterministic, predestinationist view of God is conditioned by early influences of Greek, especially Platonic streams of thought on Hellenistic (pre-Christian and Christian Palestine) theology. Many of the church fathers and scholastics as well as the reformers, especially those most influenced by Augustine's Neoplatonic world view (Calvin, etal) held to an excessively transcendent view of the creator that negatively impacts on the notion of free will and is direct opposition to the practical way in which most of us interact with God (i.e. the presupposition that prayer actually effects change as God answers).
As I say, the arguments are persuasive. If the trinitarian God is relational within the Godhead, and if that relationality is most perfectly expressed in his relation to his creation, and, if God is love, then it makes absolute sense that he does not impose his will on his creation in such a way that it negates free will or our decision to love him, or each other,
in an incoerced manner.
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